On the Need of a Methodological Approach for the Assessment of Software Architectures within ISO26262 by Bonfiglio, Valentina et al.
 CARS 2013 
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011 
On the Need of a Methodological Approach for the 
Assessment of Software Architectures within ISO26262 
Valentina Bonfiglio1, Leonardo Montecchi1, Francesco Rossi2, Andrea Bondavalli1 
1Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica, University of Firenze 
Viale Morgagni 65, I-50134, Firenze, Italy 
{valentina.bonfiglio,lmontecchi,bondavalli}@unifi.it 
 
2ResilTech s.r.l. 
Piazza Iotti 25, I-56025, Pontedera, Italy 
francesco.rossi@resiltech.com 
Abstract. Safety analysis is becoming more and more important in a wide 
class of systems. In the automotive field, the recent ISO26262 foresees safety 
analysis to be performed at different levels: system, software and hardware. The 
assessment of architecture with respect to safety is typically better understood at 
system and HW levels, while an equivalent analysis at SW level has not such an 
established background. In literature, approaches exist to handle specific activi-
ties related to the safety assessment of software, but they are typically not so 
well integrated within a more general assessment and certification process. Re-
cent safety standards put more and more emphasis on software-level safety 
analysis, therefore calling for a precise methodology for the assessment of 
software architectures. While ISO26262 requirements prescribe safety analysis 
of the software architecture, clear guidelines on how it should be performed are 
not provided, thus leaving an important gap for its industrial adoption. In this 
paper we provide our view on how such analysis should be performed, through 
the identification of well defined and repeatable activities, thus providing our 
contribution to a timely problem of great relevance in the automotive domain. 
1 Introduction  
Safety analysis supports the production of convincing evidence that the operation of 
the system is safe, i.e., even in presence of failures, catastrophic consequences on the 
user(s) and the environment are avoided [1]. To this purpose, the system architecture 
is typically analyzed using systematic techniques like Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) [2] to identify possible violations of safety requirements.   
The importance of rigorous methodologies to perform safety analysis is increasing, 
since the complexity of modern safety-critical systems and their dependence on elec-
tronic components are growing. As a consequence, software is becoming more and 
more important in the design of safety-critical systems, as more and more safety re-
quirements are assigned to it. Indeed, safety standards are starting to put more empha-
sis on software-level safety analysis. Indeed, the recent standard ISO26262 [3] for the 
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functional safety of road vehicles foresees safety analysis to be performed at different 
levels: system, hardware, and software. In the future, a similar shift may occur in 
other domains as well. It is worth to specify that within the standard, the term “safety 
analysis” identifies a precise activity: the study of faults, their correspondent effects 
and the possible mitigations to be introduced. 
While in performing safety analysis it is common practice to consider both hard-
ware and software, the assessment of architecture with respect to safety is typically 
better understood at system and hardware levels, while an equivalent analysis at soft-
ware level has not such an established background. Safety analysis of software intro-
duces significant challenges with respect to the hardware counterpart: for example, 
failure modes and related statistics aren’t typically available as datasheets. Moreover, 
even small changes to the software architecture or to its components can produce 
significant effects on the propagation or mitigation of failures. 
While ISO26262 requirements prescribe safety analysis of the software architec-
ture to be performed, clear guidelines on how such analysis should be performed are 
not provided, thus leaving an important gap for its industrial adoption. Several com-
panies in the automotive industry are adapting to ISO26262 requirements on safety 
analysis; however, public information on how they accomplish such task, and the 
current progress of this activity are typically not publicly available. The aim of this 
paper is to clarify how such analysis should be performed in order to fulfill the re-
quirements of ISO26262, through the definition of a workflow composed of well 
defined and repeatable activities.  
The paper is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in Chapter 2, focus-
ing on safety analysis of software architectures, as well as previous publications on 
the ISO26262 standard. Chapter 3 describes our workflow for the safety analysis at 
software level, and how it relates with the requirements of the ISO26262 standard. 
Finally, concluding remarks are reported in Chapter 4. 
2 Related Work  
In literature, the topic of safety analysis of software architectures has been addressed 
in different ways. Most work focuses on methods and tools to support the application 
of FMEA at software level (SW-FMEA). A well-known approach is based on failure 
propagation and transformation annotations. The design specification of the software 
architecture is annotated with information about the failure behavior of the architec-
tural components. Different notations supporting such approach exist; and one notable 
example is Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus (FPTC) [9]. Using such an 
approach, the failure behavior of the entire system can be automatically calculated 
starting from the failure behavior of its components and the design of the software 
architecture. Further details and comparison of such approaches can be found in [8]. 
Some approaches focus on detailed software FMEA, i.e., they take into account a 
code-level representation of software components and perform a qualitative analysis 
of software, based on tracing the dependencies across variables through a body of 
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source code. Other works, e.g. [6], focus on improving the manipulation of data in-
volved in the safety analysis process.  
One of the most comprehensive methods for safety analysis of system and software 
architectures is the Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies 
(HiP-HOPS) methodology [7]. HiP-HOPS modifies and integrates classical safety 
analysis techniques, guiding the analysis from the functional level through low levels 
of its hardware and software implementation, and provides support for the automation 
of certain tasks (e.g., the construction of fault-trees).  
In this paper we focus on a set of requirements dictated by the ISO26262 standard 
to define a systematic methodology that is able to fulfill them during the assessment 
process. Our objective in this paper is not to introduce novel analysis methods, but 
rather to precisely define the set of needed activities, together with their inputs and 
outputs, and organize them in a structured workflow. In this perspective, our proposal 
is complementary to other works mentioned above, which can be used to carry out 
specific activities within the workflow. 
A number of recent publications have targeted the ISO26262 standard, including 
introductions to the standard itself [11], experience reports [12], support tools [12]. 
Other publications focus on specific aspects of system development and assessment 
according to ISO26262. The work in [5] introduces a set of best practices for model 
review of software models with the aim of ensuring safety-related objectives and 
adherence to ISO26262, using a combination of automated and manual reviews. As 
mentioned above, the work in [4] addresses the formalization of requirements, target-
ing the EAST-ADL language within the ISO26262 context. A more comprehensive 
survey on recent publications related to ISO26262 can be found in [10]. 
Despite the relatively large number of publications on the new automotive stand-
ard, a proven workflow to properly support the safety evaluation of software architec-
tures according to ISO26262 requirements is still missing from industrial practice. In 
this paper we provide our contribution in filling this gap.  
3 Assessment of Software Architectures according to ISO26262 
The system lifecycle described in the ISO26262 standard foresees safety analysis 
to be performed at different levels: system, SW and HW. The importance of carrying 
out a safety analysis at the SW level is highlighted in Part 6 of the standard, “Product 
development at the software level”. In particular, within the SW lifecycle, the activity 
of software safety analysis can be contextualized within the “Software architectural 
design” phase, described in Clause 7 of Part 6 [3]. In this section, the specific clauses 
of each part of ISO 26262 are illustrated in the reference phase model for the SW 
development.  
According to requirement 7.4.13 (Part 6), safety analysis of the software architec-
ture has the aim to identify or confirm the software components on which are instanti-
ated requirements or that otherwise have an impact on them, and to support the speci-
fication of safety mechanisms and the verification of their efficiency. In this regard 
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the standard suggests some mechanisms for error detection and error handling that 
should be defined at the software architectural level. 
Part 6 explicitly states that safety analysis should be performed at the software ar-
chitectural level (requirement 7.4.13), and references Part 9 for further guidance on 
this topic. Part 9 of the standard, “Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)-oriented 
and safety-oriented analyses”, however, defines the requirements and recommenda-
tions at a generic level and does not provide specific recommendations regarding 
software.  
Summarizing, while the standard explicitly requires that safety analysis is performed 
on the software architecture, no details on how it can be performed from a practical 
point of view are provided, favoring ambiguity on activities to be performed from a 
practical point of view. From an industrial perspective, a well-defined and repeatable 
methodology is paramount, since it allows reducing efforts and costs in the assess-
ment and certification process. The idea of the methodology, that we are developing, 
is summarized as a flow of activities in Fig. 1.  
SafetyAnalysis	  
Modeling	  
SW	   FMEA
Failure	   Mitigation
Support	   activities
SM	   performance	  
analysis
SW	   Model	   Definition	  
and	   Refinement
START
END
 
Fig. 1. Our workflow for safety analysis of software architectures according to ISO26262. 
Mandatory inputs of the analysis are the software safety requirements, and the 
software architecture information. Accordingly, the first activity in the workflow, 
Safety Analysis Modeling, receives as input the safety requirements of software, and 
produces as output a set of properties that should be represented in the model. This 
also defines the fault models to be considered for software components and it covers 
requirement 8.4.6 in Part 9, which requires to define fault models consistent with the 
appropriate design phase, and part of requirement 8.4.9, which prescribes a systematic 
identification of faults and requires the evaluation of the consequences of each identi-
fied fault to determine its potential to violate safety requirements. Requirement 8.4.9 
in Part 9 requires that both the software component itself and the interaction with 
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others are considered.  Depending if the software manufacturer provides some kind of 
model or not, the model may need to be created, or enriched; therefore an additional 
activity of SW Model Definition and Refinement is needed.  
The next activity consists in performing an architectural-level SW FMEA. Its ob-
jective is to evaluate the impact of software faults, estimating the ability of the soft-
ware to provide protection from the effects of software failures. The results of the SW 
FMEA describe the possible effects of software faults on the system, and indicate if 
safety goals or safety requirements assigned to software are complied with, as re-
quired by requirements 8.4.2 and 8.4.9 in Part 9. If SW failures are still present, a 
Failure Mitigation activity is required in order to derive mechanisms that are able to 
prevent, mitigate, or reduce the effect of the potential safety requirement violation. 
This activity meets several requirements present in Part 6 and Part 9 of the ISO26262 
standard. On one hand, the specification of safety mechanisms is one of the main 
objectives of safety analysis, according to requirements 7.4.13, 7.4.14 and 7.4.15 in 
Part 9. On the other hand, requirement 8.4.3 in Part 9 explicitly states that, if a safety 
goal or safety requirement is not satisfied, the result of the analysis should be used to 
derive prevention, detection, or mitigation measures. Also, it may be necessary to 
determine additional safety-related test cases (requirement 8.4.7, Part 9) in order to 
provide evidence of correct behavior.  
After the introduction of mitigation mechanisms, a support activity, Safety Mech-
anism performance analysis, is started. This provides us evidence of the perfor-
mance of SMs that are currently defined and if necessary, proposes to evaluate alter-
native solutions as expected from requirement 7.4.13 in Part 6 and requirement 8.4.9 
in Part 9. This activity is intended mainly to drive the specification of SMs, i.e., if a 
SM is not effective it is possible to remove it. Of course, validation of implemented 
SW is done at later stage. If changes are made to the architecture or safety mechanism 
are added, the entire workflow must be repeated from the beginning. 
In order to satisfy other requirements related to safety analysis, additional support 
activities are identified. The HA&RA Support activity is related to requirements 
7.4.16 in Part 6 and 8.4.5 in Part 9, and its output provides a feedback to other phases 
of the safety lifecycle (not shown in the figure). The Interference Analysis activity, 
which is related to requirement 7.4.13 in Part 6, consists in verifying that failures of 
lower integrity modules do not have impact on higher integrity modules. 
4 Concluding Remarks  
The importance of safety analysis of software architectures is continuously growing, 
since more and more functionalities of safety-critical systems are being implemented 
by electronic devices. In particular, the recent ISO26262 standard comprises several 
requirements on the safety analysis of software; however it does not provide clear 
guidelines on how such requirements should be fulfilled. Defining a precise workflow 
for the assessment of software architectures is therefore of great industrial relevance. 
In this paper we emphasized the need of a structured workflow, and we have proposed 
a high-level view of the activities that are needed to perform a rigorous safety analysis 
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in accordance with ISO26262 requirements. We believe that this work provides useful 
insights to the automotive domain, and contributes to the solution of a timely problem 
of great industrial relevance. We are currently working on the practical development 
of this workflow, aiming at its automation and integration into a tool to support the 
safety analysis in the automotive domain. 
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